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ARTICLES
APPRENDI/BLAKELY: A PRIMER
FOR PRACTITIONERS
BRUCE CUNNINGHAM*
HEATHER RATrELADE**
AMANDA

ZIMMER***

"This case turns on the seemingly simple question
of what constitutes a 'crime.""

Justice Thomas concurring in Apprendi
"[T]oday's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing."2

Justice Scalia concurring in Ring
On July 24, 1993, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the
Structured Sentencing Act (SSA). The SSA was intended to reduce
sentence disparities and increase the ability of the Department of Corrections to anticipate prison bed space needs, among other laudable
goals. The heart of the SSA was an elaborate sentencing grid consisting of a vertical axis based on the severity of an offense and a horizontal axis based on a defendant's prior record level. (See Appendix A).
The intent of the grid was to greatly constrain judicial discretion in
sentencing and produce a more uniform set of criminal sentences
across the state. The SSA quickly became known across the country
as a model of efficient and predictable sentencing practices. However,
the SSA had a problem: it was unconstitutional.
* Bruce T. Cunningham, Jr. graduated from UNC-Chapel Hill, with a B.A. in Political
Science as a Morehead Scholar in 1970. He has been a criminal defense attorney since earning
his J.D. at the University of Virginia Law School in 1973. Mr. Cunningham serves as the North
Carolina Legal Advisor for Families Against Mandatory Minimums.
** Heather Rattelade graduated from North Carolina State University with a Bachelor's
Degree in Political Science in 2005. She is a J.D. Candidate at North Carolina Central University School of Law and will graduate in 2008. Ms. Rattelade has worked as a Mitigation Specialist since 2003.
*** Amanda Zimmer earned her J.D. from Wake Forest University in 2006, where she was a
member of Moot Court Board; competed in the Stanley Moot Court Competition, where she
was Runner up for Best Brief; and a member of the Women in Law Society. A 2003 graduate of
East Carolina University, majoring in economics, minoring in business, Ms. Zimmer has been
with the Law Offices of Bruce Cunningham for a year.
1. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
2. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The United States Supreme Court's holdings in Apprendi v. New

Jersey3 and Blakely v. Washington4 determined that "structured" sen-

tencing systems like North Carolina's, which relied on judicial fact
finding that greatly influenced the ultimate range of a defendant's potential sentence, violated a defendant's right to a jury trial secured by
the Sixth' and Fourteenth 6 Amendments to the United States Constitution. On July 1, 2005, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v.
Allen,7 held that Blakely rendered the SSA unconstitutional as applied. The SSA's fatal flaw was the judge's ability to increase a defendant's sentence, above a possible sentence under a jury verdict or a
guilty plea, through judicial fact finding based upon a mere preponderance of the evidence. However, curing the flaw by having a jury
find such facts is like opening Pandora's box, unleashing a myriad of
complex issues which go far beyond the particular issues presented in
Apprendi and Blakely.

The purpose of this article is to explore some of these complex Apprendi/Blakely issues in a manner which is useful for the courtroom
practitioner. The implications of Apprendi/Blakely are largely uncharted territory and some of the opinions expressed in this article
have not been addressed by any appellate court. In some instances,
there are North Carolina appellate decisions which the authors contend are inconsistent with the basic premise of the Sixth Amendment
line of cases. The article is intended to broaden the view of Apprendil
Blakely to include concepts that extend far beyond sentencing. The
article is divided into three parts and is geared toward the trial, appellate, and post-conviction lawyer. Part One is devoted to a discussion
of the historical context of Apprendi/Blakely and the basic conceptual
underpinnings of the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment line of
cases. Part Two presents a framework for analyzing Apprendi/Blakely
issues arising under the SSA. Part Three, appearing in a later volume
of the North Carolina Central University Law Journal,will deal exclu-

sively with capital litigation and the Sixth Amendment line.

3. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
7. State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425. 615 S.E.2d 256 (2005), abrogated by State v. Allen, 360
N.C. 569, 635 S.E.2d 899 (2006).
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PART ONE

Apprendi/Blakely in the Historical Context of North Carolina
Criminal Sentencing
Apprendi/Blakely is very complicated and at the same time very
simple. The best way to understand it is to place the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in a historical context of what criminal sentencing
was like in North Carolina before the enactment of the SSA's predecessor, the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA).
Until 1981, every crime carried with it a range of possible punishment from probation to a maximum sentence.8 Sentencing was left
completely to the unguided discretion of the trial judge. No sentence
could exceed the maximum term set by the legislature, regardless of
the defendant's prior record or any other fact. 9
For example, felonious larceny was a Class H felony which carried a
possible sentence of up to ten years in prison. Early release could be
obtained through the parole system. A defense lawyer could argue
that his or her client, with a conviction of felonious larceny and no
prior convictions, should receive probation and a prosecutor could argue that the full ten years was appropriate for a recidivist.
Due to an increasing concern about geographic sentence disparity
for the same crime and the issue of early release on parole, the legislature started to curtail the trial judge's discretion. The result was the
enactment of the FSA, which basically established a "presumptive
sentence" for each crime. A conviction for felonious larceny, nothing
else appearing, carried a three-year sentence to be imposed by all
judges. The sentencing judge could impose a minimum of probation
or a maximum of up to ten years based on the existence or absence of
considerations known as aggravating or mitigating factors.
The FSA retained the parole system in order to give inmates an
incentive to behave in prison and to give the Executive Branch a
method of controlling the total prison population. Upon entering
prison, an inmate's sentence was cut in half and he was then eligible
for parole consideration after serving one-fourth of the remaining sen8. See Act to Establish a Fair Sentencing System in North Carolina Criminal Courts, ch.
760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850 (1979) (codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87(a) (1981))
(highlighting one of a few exceptions that provided for a mandatory minimum sentence to be
imposed, specifically armed robbery which imposed a minimum of seven years imprisonment
(later amended to read as "Class D felony") to the maximum of life imprisonment).
9. See Rita v. United States, - U.S.__, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2484-85 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Tlraditionally when a judge imposed a sentence at some point in the range, say, of 0-to-5
years specified by statute fof some offense, every fact necessary to go as high as five years had
been found by the jury (or admitted), even though the jury had not made particular or implicit
findings of the facts the judge might consider in exercising discretion to set the sentence higher
or lower within the 5-year range.") (emphasis added).
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tence.1 ° As a result of the perception of a "revolving door" prison
system, prosecutors, judges, legislators and the general public became
frustrated with the FSA. 11 The legislature responded by creating the
Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission and tasked it to develop
a structured system of sentencing with emphasis on "truth in sentencing.""2 In other words, the goal was to ensure that if a judge imposed
a sentence, he or she would be assured that the inmate would serve
that term. In order to give inmates an incentive to not be disruptive, a
schedule was established in which two sentences were given to each
prisoner: (1) a maximum sentence by which the prisoner's release
date was calculated; and (2) a minimum sentence to which the inmate
could earn early release based on good behavior. Parole was abolished. This structured system became known as the SSA.
At the heart of the new system was a grid composed of a vertical
axis representing the severity of the crime and a horizontal axis
pegged to the defendant's prior record level. 3 The vertical axis contained nine categories of felonies (denoted as offense classifications)
and the horizontal axis contained six prior record levels, depending
upon the number and severity of the defendant's prior convictions.
The intersection of the vertical and horizontal axes determined the
range of possible minimum sentences which was further broken down
into three ranges: a presumptive range, an aggravated range, and a
mitigated range. A defendant was ultimately sentenced from within
one of the three ranges based on a balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors which were enumerated by the legislature as reasons to
increase or decrease a sentence.
The constitutional Achilles' heel of the SSA was the grid's rigidity,
which had two effects. First, the large number of mandatory minimum
active sentences shifted the balance of power from judges to prosecutors in deciding, in a very real sense, what sentence a defendant actually receives. Second, and of critical relevance to Apprendi/Blakely
issues, the line between the presumptive range of sentences and the
aggravated range of sentences in each block could be exceeded only
through judicial fact finding based on a preponderance of the evidence. It was this aspect of the sentencing grid that made the SSA
vulnerable to the Sixth Amendment.

10. See generally Debra L. Dailey, Summary of the 1998 Annual Conference of the National
Association of Sentencing Commissions, 11 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 89 (1998).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (2005), see infra App. A.
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The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment secures the right of every person to have a
jury determine whether or not he or she has committed a crime. "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury ...."I' The jury trial right was
one of the least controversial provisions placed in the Bill of Rights by
the Founding Fathers.' 5 The new country had just fought a war to be
free from an oppressive monarch and great faith was placed in "We
the People." The jury trial right was not bestowed upon citizens by
was considered an "unalienable" right
their government, but rather
"endowed by their Creator. '"16 Defendants enjoyed the right because
they had been "endowed by their Creator" with the right of having
"the 'truth of every accusation . . . be confirmed by the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors."" 7
Dogs and Tails
Justice Scalia, principal architect of the ApprendiBlakely revolution, has described any tampering with the right to a jury trial as being
analogous to "operating on the spinal column of American democracy." 18 The jury trial right was not tampered with until the seventies
and eighties, when state legislatures began a foray into the details of
criminal sentencing. The federal government led the way in
micromanaging sentencing with the establishment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The Supreme Court approved minor tampering with the jury trial
right in 1986. Over the spirited dissent of Justice Stevens, the Court,
in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,9 let stand a Pennsylvania statute which
provided for a mandatory minimum five year sentence for crimes in
which the defendant possessed a gun. The law provided that the determination of visible possession of a gun was merely a "sentencing
factor" which could be found by a judge by a preponderance of the
evidence, not an element of a substantive crime which must be found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.2"
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in McMillan imposed a
vague limitation on the power of the legislature to draw a line be14. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
15. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J. concurring).
16. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 20 (U.S. 1776)
17. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4
COMMENTARIES *343).
18. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
19. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
20. Id. at 85-86.
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tween criminal elements and sentencing factors by stating, "[I]n certain limited circumstances Winship's2 1 reasonable-doubt requirement
applies to facts not formally identified as elements of the offense
charged." 2 2 However, the McMillan majority could only define such
"limitations" in the most uncertain of terms. "The [Pennsylvania] statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible
possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense."23 In other words, if judicial fact finding increased punishment by a little bit, but not too much, the courts would be bound by
the characterizations placed on those facts by the legislature.
In his majority opinion in Blakely, written eighteen years after McMillan and four years after Apprendi, Justice Scalia unmercifully criticized the use of such a loose standard to decide when a defendant's
jury trial rights have been violated.
To be sure, Justice Breyer and the other dissenters would forbid those
increases of sentence that violate the constitutional principle that tail
shall not wag dog. The source of this principle is entirely unclear. Its
precise effect, if precise effect it has, is presumably to require that the
ratio of sentencing factor add-on to basic criminal sentence be no
greater than the ratio of caudal vertebrae to body in the breed of canine with the longest tail. Or perhaps no greater than the average
such ratio for all breeds. Or perhaps the median. Regrettably, Ap24
prendi has prevented full development of this line of jurisprudence.
In the post Apprendi/Blakely world, we think Justice Scalia would say
all dogs are without tails. Any addition protruding from the level of
punishment to which the defendant is exposed upon conviction of the
basic crime is part of the punishment for a new crime, not extra punishment attached to the original crime. In Justice Stevens's McMillan
dissent, he foreshadowed his majority opinion in Apprendi, saying,
"Once a State defines a criminal offense, the Due Process Clause requires it to prove any component of the prohibited transaction that
gives rise to both a 25special stigma and a special punishment beyond a
reasonable doubt.,
Apprendi v. New Jersey
Apprendi vindicated Justice Stevens's dissent in McMillan. Charles
Apprendi, Jr. was indicted in a New Jersey court on twenty-three
charges including four separate shooting offenses and unlawful pos21. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court held that all elements of crime must be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
22. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.
23. Id. at 88.
24. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 312 n.13 (2004).
25. McMillan, 447 U.S. at 96.
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session of various weapons.26 Based on his guilty plea to two counts
of second degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, the
most severe sentence he faced was 10 years.2 7 Under the plea the
State reserved the right to request the court to enhance one of the two
counts on the ground that the offense was committed with a biased
purpose.28 The judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Apprendi's act was motivated by racial bias. 29 Based on that finding,
the trial judge increased the sentence to 12 years.30
On June 24, 2000, in a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court held that
Apprendi's right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
had been violated. The Court declared what is now known as the Apprendi Rule: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."3 1
Although not specifically overruling McMillan, the Court held that
how the legislature labels a crime no longer made a difference. "[T]he
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect ... ."32 Justice Scalia,
concurring in Ring v. Arizona, made clear how irrelevant labels are
when the right to a jury trial is as stake.
I believe that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of
the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the
level of punishment that the defendant receives - whether the statute
calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or
33 Mary Jane must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a real sense, Apprendi is a reaffirmation of the bedrock principle
of judicial supremacy first announced in Marbury v. Madison.3 4 It
makes no difference whether a majority of the popularly elected legislature enacts a statute which labels a fact a certain way. If under the
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the fact is in reality something else, the will of the legislature is trumped. If something
looks like an element and acts like an element, no matter what the
legislature calls it (including Mary Jane), it is an element.
Justice Thomas cast the critical fifth vote in Apprendi. Thomas begins his concurring opinion with a succinct explanation of what is at
stake: "This case turns on the seemingly simple question of what con26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
Id. at 470.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 494.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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stitutes a 'crime."' 3 5 This statement puts into sharp focus that the
Sixth Amendment line is not about sentencing. The specific holdings
of Apprendi/Blakely are about answering two questions: (1) what is a
crime? and (2) who convicts people of crimes? As to the second question, a jury convicts people of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. As
to the first question, the answer will be the subject of litigation for
years to come as the nooks and crannies of Apprendi/Blakely are
sorted out.
A second sentence in Justice Thomas's Apprendi opinion deserves
highlighting.
Thus, if the legislature defines some core crime and then provides for
increasing the punishment of that crime upon a finding of some aggravating fact - of whatever sort, including the fact of a prior conviction the core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated crime, just as much as grand larceny is an aggravated form of
petit larceny.
The aggravating fact is an element of the aggravated
36
crime.
From Justice Thomas's perspective, Apprendi and Blakely set forth
a simple proposition: the Sixth Amendment prohibits a bench trialfor a
greater crime after a jury trialfor a lesser crime.
Two Apprendi Rule Ambiguities
The Apprendi Rule 37 contains two ambiguous phrases which have
created some problems. What does the word "penalty" in the Rule
mean? And, what is "the prescribed statutory maximum?"
Justice Stevens did not define "penalty" in his Apprendi opinion so
we are left with two possible definitions. One is that "penalty" means
the actual sentence which is imposed on the defendant by the judge.
The other is that "penalty" means the range of possible punishments
to which the defendant is exposed, regardless of what is actually imposed. Those two interpretations are very different when it comes to
deciding when the Sixth Amendment is violated. If penalty means
actual sentence imposed there can be a violation of the jury trial right
only if the sentence received by the defendant is above the prescribed
statutory maximum. If penalty means sentence to which the defendant is exposed, a mitigated range sentence can violate Apprendi.
In State v. Norris,38 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
"penalty" means the actual sentence imposed. In Norris, the defen35. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 501 (emphasis added) (Thomas, J., concurring).
37. Id., at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.").
38. State v. Norris, 360 N.C. 507, 630 S.E.2d 915 (2006).
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dant was found guilty of first degree arson. 39 The state's evidence
showed that Nathan Norris, Jr. had filled a plastic bottle with gasoline
then poured the gasoline onto his mother-in-law's trailer. He then set
fire to the trailer.4n The trial court found the aggravating factor that
Norris had "knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person." 41 After finding mitigating factors, the trial judge sentenced Norris from the presumptive
range of sentences.4 2 The North Carolina Supreme Court stated,
"[J]udicial fact-finding does not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial so long as trial courts sentence inside the presumptive or, a
fortiori, the mitigated range."43 Norris, therefore, condones judicial
fact-finding as long as the sentence the judge actually imposes is not in
the aggravated range.
The United States Supreme Court made clear, in Cunningham v.
4 4 that Norris was wrongly decided.
In Cunningham, the
California,
Court struck down California's sentencing system which involved
three possible punishments for each crime, with a judge determining
the facts justifying an upper level punishment. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, stated, "This Court has repeatedly held that,
under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a
greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and
doubt, not merely by a preponderestablished beyond a reasonable
45
evidence.
the
of
ance
Since it is extremely unlikely that any trial judges in North Carolina
will be making findings of aggravating factors, this issue is not of great
consequence to trial lawyers. n6 However, the meaning of "penalty"
could be of significance to post-conviction lawyers preparing Motions
for Appropriate Relief for defendants sentenced after Blakely where a
judge found an aggravator, regardless of whether the sentence was in
the mitigated, presumptive, or aggravated range.
The second ambiguity involves the meaning of the phrase, "prescribed statutory maximum." If judicial fact finding does not increase
the potential sentence above the prescribed statutory maximum, there
is no Sixth Amendment violation.
39. Id. at 509, 630 S.E.2d at 916.
40. Id. at 508, 630 S.E.2d at 916.
41. Id. at 509, 630 S.E.2d at 916 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(d)(8) (2005)).
42. Norris, 360 N.C. at 509, 630 S.E.2d at 916.
43. Id. at 516, 630 S.E.2d at 920.
44. Cunningham v. California, - U.S. __,127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
45. Id. at 863-64 (emphasis added).
46. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(al) (2005) ("if the defendant does not so admit,
only a jury may determine if an aggravating factor is present in an offense.").
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In State v. Lucas, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that Apprendi had no effect on the SSA because the prescribed statutory

maximum was the top of the aggravated range of sentences for Prior

Record Level VI offenders.4 7
Blakely v. Washington held that our Supreme Court was wrong.
Blakely holds that the phrase "prescribed statutory maximum" in the
Apprendi Rule is the greatest sentence to which a defendant is ex-

posed based upon the jury verdict or guilty plea alone.48 "In other
words, the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence
a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum
he may impose without any additional findings."4 9

Without additional findings, the worst that can happen to a defendant in North Carolina is a sentence at the top of the presumptive
range in prior record level one. Prior convictions, which are exempt
from the Apprendi Rule, can move a defendant horizontally across the

grid. Therefore, following Blakely, the phrase "prescribed statutory
maximum" in North Carolina means the top of the presumptive range
in the defendant's prior record level.
Blakely did not modify Apprendi but merely clarified the Apprendi
Rule, so Apprendi is the landmark case.5" On the other hand, the
effect of Apprendi was not felt in North Carolina until Blakely overruled Lucas.
Blakely v. Washington Clarifies Apprendi
Ralph Blakely was charged with kidnapping. 51 Upon conviction of

that crime he was eligible to receive a sentence of up to 53 months.52

However, due to judicial fact finding that Blakely acted with deliberate cruelty, the sentence was increased.5 3 The Supreme Court held

the Washington State sentencing law unconstitutional because the
judge found Blakely guilty of a greater crime than the crime for which

he was convicted by the jury.
47. State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 596, 548 S.E.2d 712. 731 (2001), overruled in part by State
v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256 (2005).
48. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
49. Id. at 303-04.
50. See Rita v. United States, __ U.S .....
127 S. Ct. 2456, 2487 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("If Blakely had come out the other way, the significance of Apprendi itself would be in
jeopardy: a legislature would be free to bypass Apprendi by providing an abnormally spacious
sentencing range for any basic crime (theoretically exposing a defendant to the highest sentence
just by the jury's guilty verdict), then leaving it to a judge to make supplementary findings not
only appropriate but necessary for a sentence in a subrange at the high end. That would spell the
end of Apprendi and diminish the real significance of jury protection that Apprendi had shored

up.").
51. Id. at 298, 124 S. Ct. at 2534.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 296, 124 S.Ct. at 2533.
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Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Blakely, which left no
doubt about the Court's commitment to the Apprendi principle. In
one of the most important sentences in the entire Sixth Amendment
line, Justice Scalia said, "The jury could not function as circuitbreaker
in the State's machinery of justice if it were relegated to making a
determination that the defendant at some point did something wrong,
a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition
into-the facts of the crime
54
the State actually seeks to punish.
Justice Scalia sees Apprendi/Blakely as "reversionary," not revolutionary. In his view, the Court is simply honoring the exalted position
of the jury, not a judge - a "lone employee of the state" - to decide if

someone committed a crime. 5 "The founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave [criminal justice] to the State, which
is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient, but it has always been free." 56
North Carolina'sBlakely Bill5 7

North Carolina had two responses to the overruling of Lucas by
Blakely: one legislative and the other judicial. The legislature tasked
the North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission with
the job of coming up with a response to Blakely. 8 There were two
possible options: (1) comply with Blakely by requiring a jury trial of
any fact which increased a defendant's exposure to punishment or (2)
avoid the effect of Blakely by increasing the prescribed statutory
maximum.5 9

Sentencing Commission member Judge Ronald Payne proposed a
Blakely avoidance solution of "dotting the line" between the top of
the presumptive range and the bottom of the aggravated range in each
block on the sentencing grid.60 In other words, the maximum possible
sentence to which a defendant would be exposed upon a verdict of
guilty would be the top of the aggravated range. The second option
54. Id. at 306-07.
55. Id. at 314.
56. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000).
57. In the wake of Blakely, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted Act of June 30,
2005, ch. 145, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 253 (codified by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.16, -1340.14, 924, -1022.1 (2005)).
58. Studies Act of 2004, ch. 161, § 44.1, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 546 (authorizing the North
Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission to study the North Carolina Structured
Sentencing Act).
59. Minutes from Blakely Subcommittee Meeting, N.C. Sentencing & Policy Advisory
Comm'n (Oct. 8, 2004) (on file with author).
60. Id.
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would be to simply prohibit an aggravated range sentence unless a
jury determined the existence of at least one aggravating factor.6 1
The statistics showed that the number of aggravated range
sentences actually imposed in criminal cases was relatively small,62
and a recommendation was made to the legislature to comply with
Blakely rather than avoid it.6 3 However, another Sentencing Commission member, District Attorney Ronald Moore of Buncombe County,
expressed concern about the manpower required in prosecutors' offices to include all aggravators in all felony bills of indictment, particularly since over ninety percent of cases end in guilty pleas.64
Assistant Attorney General William Hart proposed a compromise
which maintained the position of Blakely compliance but gave prosecutors some relief from possibly unnecessary paperwork. Mr. Hart
proposed that the General Assembly enact a statute similar to the
short form murder indictment, which automatically incorporates by
statutory aggravating factors into all felony
reference all
65
indictments.
In order to comply with the Due Process requirement that a defendant is entitled to notice of "the crime the state actually seeks to punish," a 30-day notice provision was placed in the statute requiring the
prosecutor to inform a defendant at least 30 days before trial of what
aggravators the State will be seeking.66 The Hart compromise was
adopted by the Commission and passed by the General Assembly.67
There are two common misconceptions about the Blakely Bill to
clarify at the outset. First, the Blakely Bill did not confer onto defendants the right to have a jury determine the existence of an Apprendi
fact. Second, the Blakely Bill did not establish a procedure for the
trial of aggravated crimes. As to the first misconception, a defendant's right to have a jury decide if he is guilty of a crime is an
61. Minutes from Blakely Subcommittee Meeting, N.C. Sentencing & Policy Advisory
Comm'n (Dec. 3, 2004) (on file with author).
62. N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FELONIES & MISDEMEANORS - FISCAL YEAR 2004/05 (JULY 1, 2004 - JUNE 30,
2005) 7 (2006), available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/200405statisticalreport.pdf.

63. Minutes from Blakely Subcommittee Meeting, N.C. Sentencing & Policy Advisory
Comm'm (Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with author).
64. Id.
65. Minutes from Blakely Subcommittee Meeting, N.C. Sentencing & Policy Advisory
Comm'm (Oct. 8, 2004) (on file with author); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-144 (2005) (bill of
indictment for homicide).

66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a6) (2005); see also Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262,
269 (1897) ("[I]t is insisted that in all criminal prosecutions the accused must be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him; that in no case can there be, in criminal proceedings, due process of law, where the accused is not thus informed, and that the information which
he is to receive is that which will acquaint him with the essential particulars of the offense .....
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a4) (2005).
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"unalienable right" which he has by virtue of being born. It is not
given to a defendant by the legislature but rather by his "Creator."
There would have been no impediment to the State including an allegation of an aggravator in an indictment, empanelling a jury and then
trying a defendant for an aggravated crime, regardless of whether the
Blakely Bill had been passed or not. As to the second misconception,
the Blakely Bill did not establish a "procedure" by which aggravated
crimes would be tried. That procedure already existed in Chapter
15A of the North Carolina General Statutes.
State v. Allen
The Blakely Bill became effective on June 30, 2005.68 It legislatively
acknowledged that Apprendi/Blakely applied to the SSA. The next
day, July 1, 2005, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that Allen
overruled Lucas, and the SSA, as applied, was unconstitutional.6 9
"Applied to North Carolina's structured sentencing scheme, the rule
of Apprendi and Blakely is: Other than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
presumptive range 70
reasonable doubt.
Allen 7 1 applied the fundamental Sixth Amendment principles set
forth in Apprendi to North Carolina. It does not matter that the legislature said it was adopting a Structured Sentencing Act. As a matter
of "effect not form," the legislature in reality was enacting a statute
which contained both a sentencing component and a substantive
crimes component. The SSA was, in the eyes of the Constitution, a
"hybrid" or "composite" statute which both defined new crimes and
then provided for the punishment of those crimes. The new crimes
consisted of, as Justice Thomas explained, a core crime and an aggravating fact. The determination of the aggravating fact, or the Apprendi fact, was therefore governed by the same principles as the trial
of any crime. Then, once the jury found a defendant guilty of the
aggravated crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the dictates of the Con68. Act of June 30, 2005, ch. 145, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 253 (codified by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15A-1340.16, -1340.14, -924, -1022.1 (2005)).
69. State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 437, 615 S.E.2d 256, 264-65 (2005) (internal citations omitted), withdrawn, State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 569, 635 S.E.2d 899 (2006).
70. Id.
71. The Allen opinion was later withdrawn in State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 569, 635 S.E.2d 899
(2006), following the United States Supreme Court opinion in Recuenco v. Washington, 126 S.
Ct. 2546 (2006). In Allen, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that Blakely errors were
structural in nature, requiring reversal in every case of Blakely error. Allen, 359 N.C. at 426, 615
S.E.2d at 258 (2005). Recuenco held that Blakely errors could be examined under harmless error
review, which does not require automatic remand for resentencing. Recuenco, 126 S.Ct. at 2553.
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stitution were satisfied and the sentencing component of the SSA became operative to establish the parameters of the final sentence.
PART

Two

In Part Two, this article proceeds to discuss in detail the impact of
Apprendi/Blakely on the SSA. Essential to an understanding of Part
Two is the acceptance of the notion that what was originally designated by the legislature as a sentencing statute is now a combination
of a statute which creates new crimes and a statute which prescribes
the ranges of punishments for those new, aggravated crimes.
In the first part of this article, we discussed the two basic questions
presented in the Apprendi/Blakely line and proposed the following answers to those questions. To the question, "What is a crime?" the
Court has held that a crime is defined as the set of essential facts
which supports the level of punishment to which the defendant is expoged, or which entitles the prosecutor to ask for a certain punishment.72 The definition of a crime can be analogized to the Roman
fasces, the axe surrounded by a bundle of sticks which was the symbol
of power of the Roman Empire. Each crime is composed of a particular number of sticks. Without all of the necessary sticks being proven
by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may not be
punished for that crime. In other words, each stick represents an "element" of a crime. A bundle may contain sticks in addition to the essential sticks which define the crime and those sticks (or sentencing
factors) may be taken into account by a judge in setting the appropriate sentence. As a matter of federal constitutional law, those extra
sticks may also be found by the judge by a preponderance of the
evidence.
For example, Felonious Larceny has four sticks: (a) carrying away
property of another, (b) valued at more than one thousand dollars, (c)
without the consent of the owner, and (d) with the intent to deprive
the owner of the property permanently.73 Apprendi/Blakely stand for
the proposition that it does not make any difference what name the
State gives to those four sticks. If those sticks must be found for the
defendant to be exposed to punishment for Felonious Larceny, they
are elements of a crime.
Part Two will discuss how to analyze Apprendi/Blakely issues.
However, the issues to be examined will be termed "second genera72. "If a fact is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment-for establishing or
increasing the prosecution's entitlement-it is an element. (To put the point differently, I am
aware of no historical basis for treating as a nonelement a fact that by law sets or increases
punishment.)" Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 521 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.
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tion" issues. That is, Part Two looks at questions other than the two
set forth above, because it is very unlikely that judges will be finding
74
the existence of aggravators in North Carolina after Blakely, Allen
and the Blakely Bill. Rather, the intriguing questions emanate from
the basic notion that Apprendi/Blakely is about crimes, not about
sentencing.
The Crime the State Actually Seeks to Punish
Reference has already been made to the critical sentence by Justice
Scalia in Blakely where the jury is likened to a "circuitbreaker in the
State's machinery of justice" and the Sixth Amendment prohibits a
"judicial inquisition" into the facts of the "crime the State actually
seeks to punish. '75 Therefore, the stepping off point is to identify
exactly what crime the state is actually prosecuting the defendant for.
Identifying the crime the state actually seeks to punish is helpful in
spotting challenges which can be made by the defendant to insulate
himself from punishment for some conduct which, under the United
States Constitution, cannot form the basis of a substantive crime.
There are two ways to describe the crime at issue. One is to simply
attach the word "Aggravated" before the basic, or core, crime. Such
as, Aggravated Felonious Larceny, if the prosecutor is seeking to expose the defendant to an aggravated range sentence for the core offense of Felonious Larceny. The second method is to actually name
the aggravator which differentiates the greater crime of Aggravated
Felonious Larceny from the lesser crime of Felonious Larceny. An
example could be, "Felonious Larceny by a Person who Possessed a
Gun at the Time of the Crime."
In terms of spotting issues, the inclusion of the aggravator in the
name of the crime is the more helpful because sometimes simply stating the name of the crime exposes the flaw. For example, it is inconceivable that in North Carolina there is such a crime as "Felonious
Larceny by a Person who Does Not Support his Children," although
failure to support a defendant's family is an aggravating factor enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(d)(18).
As Justice Thomas said in Apprendi, "the core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated crime, just as much as
grand larceny is an aggravated form of petit larceny., 7 6 Therefore, we
should adjust our terminology to always differentiate the aggravated
crime by name if the prosecutor is seeking to expose the defendant to
a greater potential sentence.
74. Remember Allen was withdrawn after Recuenco.
75. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306-07 (2004).
76. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501.
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Identify the Apprendi Fact
Except for a few particular crimes, there is only one Apprendi fact
which differentiates the aggravated form of a crime from the basic
form of the crime.7 7 The second step in analyzing Apprendi/Blakely
claims should be to identify the Apprendi fact, which is the fact that
serves to separate the aggravated crime from the core crime.
Once a single Apprendi fact is found, as a matter of federal constitutional law, other aggravators may be found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence because the second or third aggravator does
not increase punishment above the level allowed by the verdict or the
guilty plea.7" No North Carolina case has dealt with the issue of how
many Apprendi facts there are in a single case, but the Supreme Court
of Arizona in State v. Martinez,7 9 the Supreme Court of Colorado in
Lopez v. People,8 ° and the Supreme Court of California in People v.
Black (Black 11)81 have addressed the issue. Those cases concluded
that a jury need only find one aggravating factor.
In Black II, the California Supreme Court re-evaluated Black's
claims in light of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Cunningham v. California.2 In Black, the jury found special allegations
pertaining to the Defendant's parole eligibility.8 3 Based on the findings by the jury, the defendant was eligible for the upper term of punishment under California's Determinative Sentencing Law.84 The
court stated:
[S]o long as a defendant is eligiblefor the upper term by virtue of facts
that have been established consistently with the Sixth Amendment
principles, the federal Constitution permits the trial court to rely upon
any number of aggravating circumstances in exercising its discretion to
select the appropriate term by balancing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, regardless of whether the facts underlying
those cir85
cumstances have been found to be true by a jury.
The court went on to observe:
77. For example, Level I DWI, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(c) (2005), and Felonious Speeding
to Elude Arrest, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141.5(b) (2005), both require two aggravating factors.
78. As a matter of statutory law in North Carolina, a very strong argument can be made
that all aggravators, whether they are elements of crime or sentencing factors, must be found by
a jury. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16 (2005).
79. State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618 (Ariz. 2005).
80. Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Lopez v. Colorado,
546 U.S. 1017 (2005).
81. People v. Black, 161 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2007).
82. Id. at 1133.
83. People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 553 (Cal. 2005) (Kennard, J., dissenting), vacated sub
nom. Black v. California, 127 S. Ct. 1210 (2007).
84. Black, 161 P.3d at 1141.
85. Id. at 1138.
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[Apprendi] did not prohibit a judge from making findings on a sentencing factor, which it described as 'a circumstance, which may be
either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific
sentence within the range authorized by the
86 jury's finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense.'
The aggravating factor found by the jury permits the imposition of
an aggravated range punishment.8 7 Under North Carolina's sentencing scheme, there is a range of sentences from which the judge may
choose a minimum sentence. 88 Under Blakely, the top of the aggravated range is the prescribed statutory maximum once a single aggravator has been found by the jury. The trial court may take into
account aggravating factors other than the one found by the jury when
deciding which minimum sentence the defendant should receive. The
Sixth Amendment is not implicated by this judicial fact finding because the jury has already found the elements necessary to convict the
defendant of an aggravated crime, which entitles the judge to impose a
sentence in the aggravated range of minimum sentences. The precise
sentence within this range has always been in the court's discretion
and remains there following Blakely.
It is helpful to consider the Apprendi fact as the additional stick that
is added to the fasces which increases the power of the judge to impose a sentence. That stick then becomes part of the greater crime.
In turn, conviction for that greater crime justifies imposition of a
greater sentence.
Is the Apprendi fact "statutory" or "non-statutory?"
The legislature set out a list of particular facts which "aggravate the
sentence" for a core crime in the SSA. 89 It is imprecise to say that
Apprendi/Blakely "converted aggravators into elements of greater
crimes." Rather, Apprendi/Blakely made the finding of one aggravator an element of the aggravated form of the core crime.
North Carolina General Statute § 15A-1340.16(d)(20) established a
"catch-all" aggravator, which was left to the ingenuity of either the
prosecutor or the judge to articulate. For example, non-statutory aggravators submitted by the state have included, "Defendant attempted
to dispose of evidence in that he gave the 9mm handgun used to commit this offense to [a friend] immediately after commission of the of86. Id. at 1137 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000)).
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(d) (2005).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17(c).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16. Of course, there is no such thing any longer as an
aggravated sentence for a crime which is greater than the maximum allowed for the core crime
standing alone. All sentences are "within" the limit allowed by the jury verdict, never greater
than the limit allowed. We now speak in terms of aggravated crimes, not aggravated sentences.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2007

17

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 [2007], Art. 2

18

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

fense,"9 0 even though there were no officers present at that time, and
the defendant has "knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity." 9 1
We submit that only statutory aggravators may serve as Apprendi
facts. To do otherwise would, in our opinion, violate the separation of
powers clause of the North Carolina Constitution, Art. I, sec. 6. Only
the legislature can create a crime.92 If the prosecutor suggests an aggravator which is tailor-made for the case or the defendant at hand,
then in a real sense, the prosecutor is creating a crime which is applicable to just one person. The fundamental notion underlying the Bill
of Attainder clause9 3 is that in the United States, we do not have "customized crimes" which are aimed at punishing a defendant for who he
is rather than for what he has done. Therefore, if the state attempts to
use a non-statutory aggravator to increase potential punishment, the
defendant should file a motion to prohibit exposure to an aggravated
range sentence pursuant to the separation of powers clause of the
state constitution.
If there are two aggravators in a case, one statutory and the other
non-statutory, then there is nothing wrong with the non-statutory aggravator being used to elevate the defendant's punishment within the
limit set by the finding of the statutory aggravator. Because the finding of the non-statutory aggravator does not increase the penalty
above the level allowed by the finding of the statutory aggravator, it is
not an Apprendi fact.
Is the Apprendi Fact an Offense Characteristicor an Offender
Characteristic?
Offense characteristics are facts related to the commission of the
crime being prosecuted. Offender characteristics are facts related to
the defendant, separate and apart from the commission of the crime.
It is submitted that only aggravators which are considered characteristics of the offense may be used as an Apprendi fact to convict a defendant of a greater offense than the core crime.
Offender-based aggravating factors can not be elements of a crime
and, therefore, cannot be an Apprendi fact. It is fundamental in the
United States that people are punished for what they do, not who they
are. 94 Therefore, aggravators which simply describe the status of a
defendant when committing a crime cannot serve as an element of a
90. State v. Rollins, 131 N.C. App. 601, 603, 508 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1998).
91. State v. Partridge, 66 N.C. App. 427, 430, 311 S.E.2d 53, 56 (1984).
92. State v. Vert, 39 N.C. App. 26, 32, 249 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1978).
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.3.
94. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (striking down a California statute
which made being a drug addict criminal).
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new crime. For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(d)(12) provides the following as an aggravating factor, "The defendant was on
pretrial release for another crime at the time of the offense." That
aggravating factor may have been perfectly acceptable as a sentencing
factor in the pre-Blakely days. A judge could consider that fact as a
reason to increase a defendant's sentence. But it is respectfully submitted, regardless of whether the North Carolina Court of Appeals
agrees in several pending cases presenting this issue,9 5 that a defendant being on pretrial release cannot be an element of a crime. The
prejudice of allowing the prosecutor to try someone for Felonious
Larceny by a Person on Pretrial Release for Another Crime is obvious. Not only does that aggravator inform the jury of another charge,
its use erodes the presumption of innocence.
The first question that should be asked in evaluating aggravating
factors is whether "the defendant behaved in a manner that increases
his culpability for the offense."96 Generally, offender based aggravators do not increase the defendant's culpability for a crime; they
show only that he is a bad guy. In the case of the pretrial release
aggravator, the evidence will only show that the defendant may have
committed a bad act. Many courts have discussed the danger of prior
records being brought to the attention of juries during a trial. It is the
general rule that such evidence may not come in because it prejudices
the jury and causes a risk that the jury will convict based only on the
fact that the offender is a "bad guy." 97 The same logic applies when
considering other factors that tend to show the defendant as a bad
guy. Their use as an element of a greater crime runs the risk of a jury
verdict that is based on prejudice and the status of the defendant as a
bad guy, not on any objective criteria which increases his culpability
for the present offense.
Offense characteristics do not generally encounter the same
problems of prejudice. They serve the function of distinguishing those
offenses which are truly deserving of greater punishment. Our society
deems that children should be protected and places greater blameworthiness on those who take actions to corrupt children. For these reasons, the legislature included "the offense involved the sale or delivery
of a controlled substance to a minor," as an aggravating circum95. See State v. Watts, 648 S.E.2d 862, 862 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (holding an aggravating
factor that Defendant committed an offense while on pretrial release on another charge was
harmless), petition for discretionary review filed, (N.C. Sept. 24, 2007) (No. 449P05-2), denied
(N.C. Nov. 8, 2007).
96. State v. Rogers, 157 N.C. App. 127, 129, 577 S.E.2d 666, 668 (2003) (citing State v.
Bates, 76 N.C. App. 676, 678, 334 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1985)).
97. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (discussing the problem of prior
convictions being introduced to the jury).
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stance. 98 Such actions increase the culpability of the defendant and
are objectively verifiable. The basic question of whether the defendant's culpability for the offense committed is increased by the additional element is answered in the affirmative.
Offender characteristics do not relate to the crime committed and
as such can not properly increase the culpability of the defendant in
committing the act. Because our criminal justice system seeks to punish people for actions, and not for who they are, offender based characteristics can not serve as Apprendi facts. If the prosecutor uses an
offender characteristic to try to increase punishment, the defendant
should file a motion to dismiss the aggravated form of the core crime.
(See Appendix B for a chart of all aggravators and a description of
those aggravators.) However, offense characteristics are not beyond
scrutiny as other problems may arise in their use. Identifying whether
the aggravator is offender or offense based is only one step.
Is the Apprendi Fact Unconstitutionally Vague if Used as an
Element?

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1340.16 enumerates some aggravators which may
have passed vagueness muster as a sentencing factor, but cannot survive a vagueness challenge as an element. Suppose the legislature enacted a crime of assault on a very young person. How does a judge
tell a jury what the phrase, "very young" means? Or how does the
judge explain the meaning of Felonious Larceny from a Very Old Person? To determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague, the
question is whether it: (1) fails to give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, or (2) fails
to provide explicit standards for those who apply the law. 99 Under
this standard it is easy to see how the example statutes would fail.
What is very young or very old to an eighteen year old juror would
vary substantially to what is very young or very old to a sixty year old
juror. There is nothing in the statute to guide them in determining
whether this element is truly met. Therefore, it is submitted that although some factors have withstood vagueness challenges as sentencing factors, they can not withstand the increased scrutiny of being an
element of a greater offense than the core crime.
A chart analyzing the aggravating factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-1340.16 is found in Appendix B, infra.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(d)(16).
99. State v. Sanford Video & News, Inc., 146 N.C. App. 554, 556, 553 S.E.2d 217, 218 (2001)
(citing State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 597, 502 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1998)) (determining that a statute
was not unconstitutional on vagueness grounds).
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SUMMARY

The authors contend that aggravating circumstances may serve as
elements of a greater crime only if they are statutory, offense characteristics and pass vagueness muster. Applying such a test to the SSA
leaves very few aggravators which can increase potential punishment
above the Blakely limit. A look at the list of aggravators in Appendix
B reveals that only a remnant of the SSA can withstand scrutiny under
the Sixth Amendment line.
It may not happen soon, but we believe the SSA cannot survive the
Apprendi/Blakely onslaught when it comes to exposing defendants to
aggravated range sentences. Justice Scalia has commented that the
only way he can give the Sixth Amendment "intelligible content"1 ° is
to subscribe to the majority's view and "buy a ticket to Apprendiland."10 1 Apprendi-land is not some recent invention. It is the state
of things as they existed at the founding of our country. In order to
effectively represent our clients, we must set aside the procedures and
the mindset which have become familiar over the past twelve years
under the SSA because Apprendi/Blakely did not simply substitute the
jury for the judge in determining aggravating factors. As Justice
Thomas succinctly stated, it decided, "What is a crime?"
Part Three of this article, forthcoming in Issue 2 of Volume 30 of the
North Carolina Central Law Review, will address that fundamental
question in the context of capital litigation. The authors submit that
Apprendi/Blakely will revolutionize the trial of death penalty cases in
North Carolina.

100. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004).
101. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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§ 15A-1340.17(c) (2007).

PUNISHMENT LIMITS FOR EACH CLASS OF OFFENSE AND
PRIOR RECORD LEVEL.
PRIOR RECORD LEVEL

A refers to active punishment (jail time) is authorizedfor the offense level; 1 to intermediatepunishment
authorized, and C to community punishment is authorized. LIWP/D means Life imprisonmentfor the rest
of the prisoner'snatural life or Death as authorized by statute. Thus, a defendant with a prior record level
of 111, convicted of a B2 felony sentenced in the presumptive range would be subject to 176-220 months of
active confinement; active because of the letter A located in the box at the intersection of IIIand B2 and
176-220 months because that is the sentence in the presumptive range (line 3 of the box).
Offense
Classification

I

0 Pts.

A

I

III

1-4 Pts.

5-8 Pts.

IV
9-14 Pts.

V
15-18 Pts.

VI
19+ pts.

Life Imprisonment Without Parole or Death as Established by Statute

B1

A
240-300
192-240
144-192

A
288-360
230-288
173-230

A
336-420
269-336
202-269

A
384-480
307-384
230-307

A
LIWP/D
346-433
260-346

A
LIWP/D
384-480
288-384

DISPOSITION
Aggravated
PRESUMPTIVE
Mitigated

B2

A
157-196
125-157
94-125

A
189-237
151-189
114-151

A
220-276
176-220
132-176

A
251-313
201-251
151-201

A
282-353
225-282
169-225

A
313-392
251-313
188-251

DISPOSITION
Aggravated
PRESUMPTIVE
Mitigated

C

A
73-92
58-73
44-58

A
100-125
80-100
60-80

A
116-145
93-116
70-93

A
133-167
107-133
80-107

A
151-188
121-151
90-121

A
168-210
135-168
101-135

DISPOSITION
Aggravated
PRESUMPTIVE
Mitigated

D

A
64-80
51-64
38-51

A
77-95
61-77
46-61

A
103-129
82-103
61-82

A
117-146
94-117
71-94

A
133-167
107-133
80-107

A
146-183
117-146
88-117

DISPOSITION
Aggravated
PRESUMPTIVE
Mitigated

E

I/A
25-31
20-25
15-20

I/A
29-36
23-29
17-23

A
34-42
27-34
20-27

A
46-58
37-46
28-37

A
53-66
42-53
32-42

A
59-74
47-59
35-47

DISPOSITION
Aggravated
PRESUMPTIVE
Mitigated

F

I/A
16-20
13-16
10-13

I/A
19-24
15-19
11-15

I/A
21-26
17-21
13-17

A
25-31
20-25
15-20

A
34-42
27-34
20-27

A
39-40
31-39
23-31

DISPOSITION
Aggravated
PRESUMPTIVE
Mitigated

G

I/A
13-16
10-13
8-10

I/A
15-19
12-15
9-12

I/A
16-20
13-16
10-13

I/A
20-25
16-20
12-16

A
21-26
17-21
13-17

A
29-36
23-29
17-23

DISPOSITION
Aggravated
PRESUMPTIVE
Mitigated

H

C/I/A
6-8
5-6
4-5

I/A
8-10
6-8
4-6

I/A
10-12
8-10
6-8

I/A
11-14
9-11
7-9

I/A
15-19
12-15
9-12

A
20-25
16-20
12-16

DISPOSITION
Aggravated
PRESUMPTIVE
Mitigated

I

C
6-8
4-6
3-4

C/I
6-8
4-6
3-4

I
6-8
5-6
4-5

I/A
8-10
6-8
4-6

I/A
9-11
7-9
5-7

I/A
10-12
8-10
6-8

DISPOSITION
Aggravated
PRESUMPTIVE
Mitigated
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APPRENDI/BLAKELY
APPENDIX

B:

ANALYZING AGGRAVATORS

This chart analyzes the aggravating factors listed in N.C.
using the analysis discussed in the article.
Aggravating Factor

GEN. STAT.

§ 15A-1340.16 (2007)

Offender or
Offense Based?

Can it be an Apprendi fact? Why?

(1) The defendant induced others
to participate in the commission of
the offense or occupied a position
of leadership or dominance of other
participants.

Offense

Yes. Offense based aggregating factor which is concrete and increases
the defendant's culpability.

(2) The defendant joined with more
than one other person in committing the offense and was not
charged with committing a conspiracy.

Offense

No. Separation of Powers issue
because prosecution can manipulate
the charges to either charge an
additional crime or to increase punishment. Also a possible diminished responsibility of the jury issue
because it would be implied to the
jury that the defendant already
received a break by not being
charged with conspiracy.

(2a) The offense was committed for
the benefit of, or at the direction
of, any criminal street gang, with
the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, and the
defendant was not charged with
committing a conspiracy. A "criminal street gang" means any ongoing
organization, association, or group
of three or more persons, whether
formal or informal, having as one
of its primary activities the commission of felony or violent misdemeanor offenses, or delinquent acts
that would be felonies or violent
misdemeanors if committed by an
adult, and having a common name
or common identifying sign, colors,
or symbols.

Offense

No. Separation of Powers issue
because prosecution can manipulate
the charges to either charge an
additional crime or to increase punishment. Also a possible diminished responsibility of the jury issue
because it would be implied to the
jury that the defendant already
received a break by not being
charged with conspiracy.

(3) The offense was committed for
the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an
escape from custody.

Offense

In part. Preventing arrest is valid
as an Apprendi fact. As to custody,
there is a problem because the jury
would be informed that the defendant was in custody which is prejudicial.

(4) The defendant was hired or
paid to commit the offense.

Offense

Yes. Concrete facts that are not
elements of the underlying crime
which increase culpability.

(5) The offense was committed to
disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise
of any governmental function or the
enforcement of laws.

Offense

Yes.
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(6) The offense was committed
against or proximately caused serious injury to a present or former
law enforcement officer, employee
of the Department of Correction,
jailer, fireman, emergency medical
technician, ambulance attendant,
social worker, justice or judge, clerk
or assistant or deputy clerk of
court, magistrate, prosecutor, juror,
or witness against the defendant,
while engaged in the performance
of that person's official duties or
because of the exercise of that person's official duties.

Offense

Yes.

(7) The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,

Offense

No. Unconstitutionally vague when
evaluated as an element of a crime.

(8) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more
than one person by means of a
weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of
more than one person.

Offense

Maybe. Under some circumstances,
it may be unconstitutionally vague
when evaluated as an element of a
crime.

(9) The defendant held public office
at the time of the offense and the
offense related to the conduct of
the office.

Offender and
Offense

Maybe. It is constitutional so long
as the defendant is not charged
with an offense for which these
facts are elements of the offense.
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